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The Shipping Act of 1984: Bringing The
United States in Harmony with
International Shipping Practices
I. Introduction
The Shipping Act of 19841 represents a significant change in
America's perception of its role in international legal and commer-
cial transactions. This change is exemplified in subsection 2 of the
new Act's Declaration of Policy' which asserts that the purpose of
the legislation is "to provide an efficient and economic transportation
system in the ocean commerce of the United States that is, insofar
as possible, in harmony with, and responsive to, international ship-
ping practices . . ... - This policy statement illustrates Congres-
sional recognition that the United States can no longer dictate its
economic policies to other nations. This is particularly true in the
area of international shipping where, under the ever narrowing inter-
pretation of the regulatory statute that preceded the Shipping Act of
1984," the United States had attempted to impose its antitrust laws
on a world that believed competition would not lead to increased effi-
ciency in international shipping given the peculiar economic nature
of the international ocean liner industry.5
The Shipping Act of 1984 undoubtedly responds to the nonregu-
latory policies of other nations. It does not, however, adopt a
1. Shipping Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-237, 98 Stat. 67 (codified at 46 U.S.C.A. §
1701-20 (West Supp. 1984)) [hereinafter cited as 1984 Act].
2. 1984 Act § 2(2), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1701(2) (West Supp. 1984).
3. Id. (emphasis added). This Comment will focus on the second of the three policy
statements contained in the Declaration of Policy. 1984 Act § 2, 46 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (West
Supp. 1984). The Declaration of Policy states in its entirety:
The purposes of this chapter are-
(1) to establish a nondiscriminatory regulatory process for the common car-
riage of goods by water in the foreign commerce of the United States with a
minimum of government intervention and regulatory costs;
(2) to provide an efficient and economic transportation system in the ocean
commerce of the United States that is, insofar as possible, in harmony with, and
responsive to, international shipping practices; and
(3) to encourage the development of an economically sound and efficient
United States-flag liner fleet capable of meeting national security needs.
4. Prior to the Shipping Act of 1984, United States shipping was regulated under the
Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728 (1916) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C.A. §9
801-42 (1975))[hereinafter cited as 1916 Act].
5. Ocean shipping is generally unregulated in the rest of the world. Cira, The Challenge
of Foreign Laws to Block American Antitrust Actions, 18 STAN J. INT'L L. 247, 253, 272
(1982)[hereinafter cited as Cira].
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nonregulatory stance. To what extent then does the new Act bring
American shipping law in harmony with the policies of other na-
tions? And to what extent did traditional antitrust philosophy pre-
vent Congress from conforming United States law to international
shipping practices? These are the topics addressed in this Comment.
To place the new Act in context, the Comment begins by outlin-
ing the development of ocean liner conferences' and the economics of
liner operations. It then describes the changes in case law that in-
creased foreign carriers'7 exposure to antitrust liability and caused
foreign governments to enact retaliatory "blocking" statutes8 in an
effort to protect their nationals from the extraterritorial application
of United States laws. The major portion of the Comment then ana-
lyzes the Shipping Act of 1984 and compares the provisions that are
responsive to international shipping practices with those that remain
in conflict with generally accepted shipping policies. Finally, to illus-
trate how the Act will operate, the key provisions are applied to a
fact situation based on the shipping cases9 credited with provoking
6. The primary function of the 1984 Act is to regulate the formation of anticompetitive
liner conferences. "Liners," as opposed to other types of cargo ships, are "[s]hips that operate
as common carriers on regular routes with published freight rates. They normally carry diverse
cargoes and their services are available to all shippers." CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE.
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S. SHIPPING AND SHIPBUILDING: TRENDS AND POLICY
CHOICES 37 (1984). A "conference" of liner ships is "an association of ocean common carriers
permitted, pursuant to an approved or effective agreement, to engage in concerted activity and
to utilize a common tariff .... " 1984 Act § 3(7), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1702(7) (West Supp. 1984).
"'The word "conference" denotes no single system but is a generic term covering a wide vari-
ety of common services and common obligations undertaken by shipowners serving particular
trades.'" United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Liner Conference Sys-
tem Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat para. 11, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.4/62/Rev.1 (1970),
quoting European Ministers' March 1963 Resolution-Memorandum from European Ship-
owners, December 1963, Introduction para. 2. See CHAMBER OF SHIPPING OF THE UNITED
KINGDOM, ANNUAL REPORT 224 App. III (1963-1964).
As of the time of the 1970 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development study
of conference practices there were approximately "360 conferences operating in the various
trades of the world." United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Liner Con-
ference System Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat para. 8, U.N. Do. TD/B/C.4/62/Rev.1
(1970).
7. A "carrier," or "common carrier," is defined as "a person holding itself out to the
general public to provide transportation by water of passengers or cargo between the United
States and a foreign country for compensation . . .." 1984 Act § 3(6), 46 U.S.C.A. §
1702(6) (West Supp. 1984). A "carrier" must be distinguished from a "shipper." The latter is
"an owner or person for whose account the ocean transportation of cargo is provided or the
person to whom delivery is to be made." 1984 Act § 3(23), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1702(23) (West
Supp. 1984).
8. A "blocking statute" restricts "the extent to which United States litigants can obtain
evidence or production of commercial documents abroad for use in investigations or proceed-
ings in the United States, and, secondly, the enforcement of United States judgments." Pettit
and Styles, The International Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United States
Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. LAw. 697, 699 (1982)[hereinafter cited as Pettit & Styles].
9. United States v. North Atlantic Container Line, Ltd., No. 79-271 (D.D.C. filed June
1, 1979); In re Ocean Shipping Antitrust Litigation, 500 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(concerning approximately thirty private treble damage actions consolidated as a class action),
settled, 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,585 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 1982); In re Unfiled Agree-
ments in the North Atlantic Trades, No. 79-83 (F.M.C. filed Aug. 14, 1979, discontinued,
June, 1984) [these cases are hereinafter cited as North Atlantic Shipping Cases].
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foreign retaliation.
II. Background
A. Development of Liner Shipping Conferences
With the advent of steamships in the latter part of the nine-
teenth century and the resulting establishment of regular sailing
schedules, ocean common carriers organized international shipping
cartels, known as liner conferences, to protect themselves from the
fierce competition that otherwise would have driven many carriers
out of business. 10 In the process of protecting their own members,
these conferences also developed numerous predatory practices"
designed to achieve monopoly control.
Concurrent with these developments, the Sherman Antitrust"
and Clayton"3 Acts were passed in the United States and antitrust
philosophy rapidly gained popularity." In response to the predatory
conduct of the liner conferences the United States Congress ordered
an investigation. 5 In 1914 what is now known as the Alexander
Committee Report' was issued.
The Report concluded that while monopolistic abuses did occur
and regulation of the shipping industry was necessary, the confer-
10. H.R. REP. No. 53, Pt. 2, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 221, 221 [hereinafter cited as the JUDICIARY COMMITTEE RE-
PORT]. The latter half of the nineteenth century was marked by expanded shipbuilding, caus-
ing overcapacity and increased competition in addition to the competition provided by sailing
ships that sought to undercut the prices of their more regular steam-powered opponents. Id.
11. Examples of these predatory practices include the following:
"Fighting ships"--conference-operated ships that would offer "rates below cost to attract
any cargo that would otherwise go to independent tramps and non-conference lines." Larsen
and Vetterick, The UNCTAD Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences: Reservations, Reac-
tions and U.S. Alternatives, 13 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 223, 227 n.20 (1981)[hereinafter
cited as Larson & Vetterick]. (A "tramp ship" is "one that operates on an irregular or non-
scheduled basis from one port of lading to one port of discharge .... " Garvey, Regulatory
Reform in the Ocean Shipping Industry: An Extraordinary U.S. Commitment to Cartels, 18
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 5 n.4 (1984)[hereinafter cited as Garvey]).
"Deferred rebates"-rebates granted to a shipper who uses the carriers of one conference
exclusively. JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 2, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 221.
"Loyalty Contracts"-"a contract with an ocean common carrier or conference ... by
which a shipper obtains lower rates by committing all or a fixed portion of its cargo to that
carrier or conference." 1984 Act § 3(14), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1702(14) (West Supp. 1984). See
infra text accompanying notes 207-09.
12. The Sherman Antitrust Act was passed in 1890. Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-7, 26
Stat. 209-10 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)).
13. The Clayton Act was passed in 1914. Clayton Act, ch. 323, §§ 1-8, 10-16 & 26, 38
Stat. 730-40 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982)).
14. H.R. REP. No. 53, Pt. 1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 167, 171 [hereinafter cited as the MERCHANT MARINE AND FISH-
ERIES COMMITTEE REPORT].
15. Id. at 5, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 170.
16. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, REPORT ON
STEAMSHIP AGREEMENTS AND AFFILIATIONS IN THE AMERICAN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC
TRADE, HR. Doc. No. 805, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1914).
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ence system was essential to the smooth operation of international
ocean shipping." As a result, Congress passed the Shipping Act of
191618 under which the United States Shipping Board (now the Fed-
eral Maritime Commission)19 was given authorization to grant lim-
ited antitrust immunity to the liner conferences.2"
Developments during the 1960's and 1970's, however, made the
1916 Shipping Act obsolete. Case law increasingly restricted the an-
titrust immunity granted under the Act. 1 And, when the worldwide
economy fell into a general recession in the 1970's and foreign carri-
ers inundated the comparatively lucrative22 United States trade,23
many international conferences that thought they were protected
under the 1916 Act found themselves, under the new case law, ac-
cused of violating United States antitrust laws. These carriers were
suddenly held liable for acts which, at one time, would have been
immunized from antitrust prosecution. 2'
Compounding the irritation of this expansion of antitrust liabil-
ity was the fact that acts considered illegal under United States law
were often legal in the carrier's home nation. Foreign governments
were shocked to see their nationals subject to United States jurisdic-
tion, United States discovery procedures, and attempts by United
States courts to enforce their judgments abroad. Unlike the United
17. JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 222.
18. See supra note 4.
19. The Federal Maritime Commission is frequently referred to throughout the text as
the Federal Maritime Commission, the FMC, or the Commission.
20. 1916 Act § 15, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1982). See also MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHER-
IES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 6, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 171.
21. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Commission, 390 U.S. 261
(1968); Federal Maritime Commission v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238
(1968); Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213 (1965); Sabre Shipping
Corp. v. American President Lines, 285 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
922 (1969).
22. MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 6, 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 171 ("The American economy not only generates the larg-
est single portion of the world's ocean cargoes; but the size of the market, coupled with the
U.S. free trade philosophy, also made these routes the most accessible and lucrative.").
23. The term "United States trade" refers to the sea lanes leading in and out of United
States ports.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Atlantic Container Line, Ltd., No. 79-271 (D.D.C. filed
June 1, 1979).
25. Viscount Dilhorne, in Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v. Westinghouse Electric Corpora-
tion, 1978 A.C. 547, stated:
For many years now the United States has sought to exercise jurisdiction
over foreigners in respect of acts done outside the jurisdiction of that country.
This is not in accordance with international law and has led to legislation on the
part of -other states, including the United Kingdom, designed to protect their
nationals from criminal proceedings in foreign courts where the claims to juris-
diction by those courts are excessive and constitute an invasion of sovereignty.
Id. at 631, quoted in Pettit & Styles, supra note 8, at 698. See also British Threaten Retalia-
tion over Shipping Antitrust Judgments, [July-Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
No. 922, at A-31 (July 12, 1979).
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States, most foreign countries traditionally do not apply their anti-
trust laws to international shipping." Indeed, many countries toler-
ate and even support conference activity. 7 In response to the extra-
territorial application of United States antitrust laws, a number of
countries passed blocking statutes which limited the use of United
States discovery procedures within their borders and prohibited en-
forcement of antitrust judgments."
The failure of United States courts to consider the fact that
these carriers may not have been violating any law in their own
countries, and the failure of the United States Government to inter-
vene, particularly in private treble damage actions, has significantly
injured United States foreign relations2 9 United States carriers have
also been affected. Foreign carriers hesitate to enter into conference
agreements with United States carriers for fear of antitrust repri-
sals.30 Conferences complying with United States antitrust laws do
not have powers equal to foreign conferences and therefore find it
more difficult to compete."1 And, as a result of foreign blocking stat-
utes, the only carriers punished for antitrust violations are United
States carriers.3 2
The basis for these conflicting approaches to international ship-
26. MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 9, 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 174. "The only country that effectively regulates liner
conferences is the United States. ... Larsen & Vetterick, supra note 11, at 224 n.3. See
also Kryvoruka, American Ocean Shipping and the Antitrust Laws Revisited, 11 J. MAR. L &
COM. 67, 84 (1979)[hereinafter cited as Kryvoruka]. European countries take a more prag-
matic approach, recognizing that cartels may be socially or economically useful by contribut-
ing to improved efficiency. SLETMO AND WILLIAMS, LINER CONFERENCES IN THE CONTAINER
AGE 268 (1981) [hereinafter cited as SLETMO & WILLIAMS]. See also Huntley, The Protection
of Trading Interests Act 1980: Some Jurisdictional Aspects of Enforcement of Antitrust
Laws, 30 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 213, 218 (1981)[hereinafter cited as Huntley]. See generally
infra note 34 and accompanying text.
27. Rosenthal, An Overview of the Guide and Its Objectives, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS 89 (J. Griffin ed.
1979) [hereinafter cited as PERSPECTIVES].
28. See infra text accompanying notes 110-19.
29. Pettit & Styles, supra note 8, at 698 ("The heat which United States antitrust laws
continue to engender amongst states otherwise friendly to the United States reflects the poten-
tially devastating impact of an award of triple damages against trading interests outside the
United States.").
30. MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 9, 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 174.
31. 1916 Act § 15, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1982), required that the "conferences serving the
U.S. trade must be 'open' (that is, membership could not be restrictive.) MERCHANT MARINE
AND FISHERIES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 6, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 171. Although "open" conferences are undoubtedly the most competitive, experts claim that
"closed" conferences (those with restricted membership) operate with full rationalization and
therefore are the most efficient. As a result, closed conferences are able to provide the lowest
cost of service. SLETMO & WILLIAMS, supra note 26, at 12. See infra text accompanyifig notes
204-06.
32. MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 9, 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 174. See also Friedmann & Devierno, The Shipping Act of
1984: The Shift from Government Regulation to Shipper "Regulation," 15 J. MAR. L. &
CoM. 311, 319 (1984)[hereinafter cited as Friedmann & Deviernol.
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ping regulation lies in the contradictory economic assumptions made
by the United States and other nations regarding operation of the
international liner industry.
B. Economics of Liner Operation
Prior to passage of the Shipping Act of 1984 and the investiga-
tions that led up to it, the restrictions placed on international ship-
ping by the United States Congress and United States courts
stemmed from the antitrust philosophy that competition leads to
more efficient use of resources and lower prices for consumers. 3 The
lack of European regulation of international shipping,3 4 on the other
hand, was based on the recognition that in certain situations cartels
can contribute to efficiency and price stability.s5 It was inevitable
that these opposing philosophies and the ensuing regulations would
come into conflict in the area of liner conferences. This is particu-
larly true given the multinational nature of the cartels s" and the eco-
nomic structure of the international liner industry.
Cartelization is essential to efficient operation of the liner indus-
try because of the nature of liner operations.3 ' Liners are common
carriers which carry a wide variety of goods on regular routes at
published freight rates. 88 They cater to shippers who ship-quantities
of goods which are neither large enough to fill a tramp vessel 39 nor
frequent enough to induce a shipper to lease or buy his own vessel. °
The essential characteristic of liner shipping which sets it apart from
all other forms of ocean transport is that liners sail on a scheduled
33. Antitrust enforcement by the United States Government has two major pur-
poses with respect to international commerce. The first is to protect the Ameri-
can consuming public by assuring it the benefit of competitive products and
ideas produced by foreign competitors as well as domestic competitors. . . . The
second major antitrust enforcement purpose is to protect American export and
investment opportunities against privately imposed restrictions.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OP-
ERATIONS 4-5, reprinted in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 27, at 182-83.
34. See Larsen & Vetterick, supra note 11, at 224 n.3. See also United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development, The Regulation of Liner Conferences at 14-15, U.N. Doc.
TD/104/Rev.l (1972).
35. Kryvoruka, supra note 26, at 84; SLETMO & WILLIAMS, supra note 26, at 268.
36. "Significant to these organizations [i.e., liner conferences] was and is the fact that,
regardless of the trade in which they operate, these cartels demonstrate relatively little indica-
tion of dominance by business organizations representing any single nation." MERCHANT
MARINE AND FISHERIES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 5, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 170.
37. "It is not by chance that conference agreements have existed for more than a hun-
dred years in the liner industry, whereas repeated attempts to organize other shipping markets
such as tankers and tramps have failed." SLETMO & WILLIAMS, supra note 26, at 11. But see
Garvey, supra note II (author's basic premise is that conferences do not need special antitrust
protection because their rates would respond to demand).
38. See "Liners" supra note 6.
39. See "tramp ship" supra note 11.
40. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Liner Conference Sys-
tem Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat para. 8, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.4/62/Rev.1 (1970).
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date and at a scheduled time,4 even if it means sailing with a half-
empty ship.42 It is this unique combination-guaranteed supply of
shipping capacity paired with fluctuations in shipper demand-that
justifies granting liner conferences antitrust immunity. To under-
stand this point, it is essential to understand the economic structure
of liner operations.
Once a liner is scheduled to sail it is immediately faced with
substantial fixed costs.43 In order to break-even, each carrier must
either attract enough cargo to fill at least eighty percent of its capac-
ity or risk charging shippers uncompetitive prices per unit shipped.4'4
Reducing prices has not been found to increase shipper demand
since the market for liners is price inelastic.'3
Ensuring that a liner is at complete or near complete utilization
on the scheduled sailing date is especially crucial given the volume
involved. The amount of space wasted on a half-empty liner (an
amount which corresponds directly to lost revenue) dwarfs the
wasted space on a half-empty airfreight carrier, truck, or boxcar.
"The problem is considerably more serious than for domestic and/or
air common carriers since the unit (the ship) in which the service is
'produced' is much larger in relation to total annual traffic volume
than the units in which domestic carriers 'produce' their services."' 46
In addition, the capacity is large even in relation to the total trade
volume, not to mention the relation to individual cargo from several
hundred shippers.47 Shipping at less than 100 percent capacity
means a great deal of lost revenue. And the capacity-to-volume-of-
trade problem has increased substantially since the 1960's because of
the advent of containerization.' 8
"Containers" are twenty to forty foot long trailers identical to
those drawn by trucks on highways.' 9 Ships built to carry containers
41. Shippers rely on the regular sailing schedules liners offer because: (1) they cannot
afford the expense of having their merchandise stored in a warehouse until an entire shipload
has accumulated; (2) manufactured goods are often subject to quick obsolescence; and (3) the
volume each individual shipper wishes to transport is not very large in comparison to the ca-
pacity available on today's modern, particularly containerized, vessels. See SLETMO & WIL-
LIAMS, supra note 26, at 17-19. See also infra text accompanying note 49.
42. Id. at 9.
43. The only costs to a carrier that may vary, and hence the only place where rates
might be lowered, are those directly connected with the loading and unloading of different
types of commodities. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Liner Con-
ference System Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat para. 15, U.N. Doec. TD/B/C.4/62/
Rev.l (1970).
44. MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 14, 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 179.
45. Markets are termed "price inelastic" when they are insensitive to price levels and
changes. SLETMO & WILLIAMS, supra note 26, at 63.
46. Id. at xxix.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 42.
49. Id. at xxviii.
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can be loaded and unloaded faster, meaning they can spend more
time at sea. The result is a significant increase in productivity.
To fill this enormous capacity in the face of price-inelastic and
fluctuating demand and high fixed costs, carriers operating in a free
market system would be forced to reduce their prices below cost in
response to cut-throat competition.5" The result is that most carriers
would either merge with larger companies or go out of business.
Liner conferences were organized specifically for the purpose of
preventing this type of self-destructive competition.5 Their methods
include setting uniform rates, 2 limiting the number of sailings in a
trade,5" chartering space on one another's vessels, 54 pooling reve-
50. Not only would carriers compete with each other, competition would come from
other sources as well. Liner conferences are not monopolies. SLETMO & WILLIAMS, supra note
26, at 194. In today's market they must compete with air freight, tramp ships, and non-liner
vessels. Id. at xxxii. In addition, a substantial number of state-controlled and subsidized carri-
ers have entered the United States liner market. The Soviet Union lines, for example, "in-
creased their penetration of the U.S. liner market from 0.4 percent of total tons carried in
1971 to 2.9 in 1976." Id. at 118. The offer of rates by state-subsidized carriers significantly
below the costs of American-flag carriers caused Congress to take action in the form of the
Controlled Carrier Act, which was enacted in 1978 and amended in 1979. The Controlled
Carrier Act was continued, with minor amendments, as § 9 of the Shipping Act of 1984, 46
U.S.C.A. § 1708. Controlled Carrier Act of 1979, 46 U.S.C. § 817 (1982) (amending 1916
Act, 46 U.S.C. § 817, amended by 1984 Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 1708 (West Supp. 1984)). For a
detailed background on the problem of state-controlled carrier competition in the U.S. trades,
see S. REP. No. 1260, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3536.
Specialization resulting from the use of containers has also increased competition among
conferences. Shippers on the Gulf coast, for example, can now pack a container truck and send
it to the Atlantic coast if they do not like the prices offered by Gulf coast operators. See supra
text accompanying note 49.
But see Garvey, supra note 11, 1-10. Some economists do not agree that shipping confer-
ences prevent destructive competition. They question the underlying assumption that the liner
shipping market is inelastic and instead assert that demand is responsive to rate changes (there
are alternate methods now-air freight, tramps, non-conference ships), that competition in the
industry will not result in an ultimate all-powerful monopoly, and that the cost of industry
stability is high and ultimately borne by the consumer. Id.
51. The first conference was formed in 1875 to participate in the United Kingdom-Cal-
cutta trade as a response to severe competition that arose with the opening of the Suez Canal
in 1869. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Liner Conference Sys-
tem Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat para. 8, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.4/62/Rev.l (1970).
See also D. MARX, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CARTELS: A STUDY OF SELF-REGULATION BY
SHIPPING CONFERENCES 3 (1953)[hereinafter cited as MARX]. ("Historically it seems that
most conference agreements were prompted by the necessity of stopping, or at least of avoid-
ing, the insanity of cutthroat competition ....").
52. In order to enforce the agreement on rates effectively the members also agree
to follow the same rules and regulations for calculating freight charges, payment
of freight, acceptable packaging for different commodities, issue of bills of lading
and uniform rates of commission to agents or brokers. These rules are necessary
because charging uniform rates by itself may not fully eliminate rate competi-
tion between the member lines.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Liner Conference System Report
by the UNCTAD Secretariat para. 14, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.4/62/Rev.l (1970).
53. JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 18, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 238.
54. Id.
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nues,55 and harmonizing sailing schedules and ports of call." The
basic purpose of this self-regulation is to minimize losses or maxi-
mize profits by ensuring as complete a use of vessel capacity as pos-
sible at rates sufficient to allow a profit."
Because of these economic factors, the competition oriented an-
titrust approach to trade cannot be successfully applied to the inter-
national liner shipping industry. The laissez faire approach of na-
tions other than the United States permits the industry to operate
with increased efficiency. It is for this reason that other nations have
chosen a nonregulatory approach as opposed to the proregulatory
stance of the United States.
Within the past decade Congress began to acknowledge the eco-
nomic practicalities of this nonregulatory point of view and incorpo-
rated much of its philosophy in the Shipping Act of 1984. This
change in Congressional attitude did not come, however, until nu-
merous court cases in the 1960's and 1970's heaped increasingly re-
strictive interpretations upon the antitrust immunity provisions of
the Shipping Act of 1916. The confusion in United States shipping
law and the conflicts between it and foreign laws obfuscated the
boundary of antitrust liability. 8
III. Case Law and Foreign Reaction
United States antitrust laws were not applied extraterritorially
to foreign carriers when the Shipping Act of 1916 was first enacted.
From 1916 to the late 1970's, however, a series of developments oc-
curred in American case law that permitted American courts to hold
foreign carriers liable for antitrust violations. First, the courts deter-
mined under what conditions they had jurisdiction to apply antitrust
laws extraterritorially. Second, in cases involving violations of the
Shipping Act of 1916, the courts determined that a plaintiff could
seek a remedy under antitrust laws rather than the Shipping Act.
Third, the courts narrowed the extent of antitrust immunity granted
55. Id.
56. MARX, supra note 51, at 3.
57. Id. For the shipper, conferences offer the following advantages: (I) the ability to
offer fixed and relatively stable rates published in advance, permitting shippers to calculate
their costs and know before transporting how much to charge for their goods; (2) uniform
rates; (3) the ability to serve ports with low cargo movements (and therefore low sources of
revenue), as well as ports with substantial cargo movements because the losses incurred in
servicing one port can be offset against the profits earned from another; and (4) competition
among conferences for better service to the shipper, all other variables being uniform. United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Liner Conference System Report by the
UNCTAD Secretariat paras. 27, 28, 30, & 32, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.4/62/Rev.1 (1970).
58. Since 1961, "[ajntitrust standards rather than commercial maritime standards have
had a disproportionate weight in processing maritime agreements in the foreign commerce of
the United States." MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14,
at 9, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 174.
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under section 15 of the 1916 Act. And fourth, to assist in antitrust
investigations, United States courts claimed jurisdiction to order for-
eign nationals to submit to United States discovery and enforcement
procedures.
These developments in United States case law are described be-
low to illustrate how the persistent export of United States antitrust
philosophy provoked foreign governments into passing retaliatory
legislation that, in turn, induced Congress to rethink United States
international shipping policy.
A. Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws
The United States v. Aluminum Co. of America"9 (Alcoa) deci-
sion of Judge Learned Hand marked the beginning of the extraterri-
torial application of United States antitrust laws. Alcoa involved two
agreements entered into outside the United States by a Canadian
aluminum company (once a subsidiary of the Aluminum Company
of America) and several European companies; no American was a
party to the agreement. The purpose of the alliance was to limit the
sale of foreign aluminum in the United States so that the Aluminum
Company of America would not need to compete with imports. In an
action brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 0 Judge Hand
determined that the United States courts could impose antitrust lia-
bilities upon persons outside the allegiance of the United States if
(1) those persons intended their actions to have an affect on United
States imports; and (2) their actions actually affected United States
imports in contravention of United States law.6"
This "effects doctrine," as Judge Hand's pronouncement in Al-
coa came to be known, is the basis for the United States Department
of Justice Antitrust Division's actions concerning international com-
merce. This doctrine is explicitly stated in the Division's publication,
Antitrust Guide for International Operations: "The U.S. antitrust
laws . . . are not limited to transactions which take place within our
borders. When foreign transactions have a substantial and foresee-
able effect on U.S. commerce, they are subject to U.S. law regard-
less of where they take place."6
This doctrine is the primary cause of irritation and concern be-
tween the United States and foreign governments because all extra-
territorial applications of United States antitrust laws stem from the
59. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
60. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
1 (1982)). Section 1 of Title 15 bars "[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.
61. 148 F.2d at 443-44.
62. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL OPERATIONS 6-7, reprinted in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 27, at 184-85.
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Alcoa pronouncement.63 Although foreign governments recognize
that the United States is not the only country to claim jurisdiction
over foreign conduct affecting matters within its borders,", they
point out that the United States is the only country to regularly ex-
ercise that jurisdiction. 5
The quarrel with the effects doctrine lies not only with the ex-
traterritorial exercise of United States jurisdiction, but with the
manner in which United States courts have applied the doctrine.
Notwithstanding the Antitrust Division's statement that application
of United States jurisdiction to international antitrust matters
"should avoid unnecessary interference with the sovereign interests
of foreign nations,"' 8 most United States court determinations have
failed to consider the interrelationship of anticompetitive conduct
and the public policy and national interests of the other countries."
Until passage of the Shipping Act of 1984, neither case law nor stat-
utes affecting the extraterritorial application of United States anti-
trust laws required any consideration of the concerns of other nations
in the event of a conflict of laws. This general insensitivity on the
part of United States Government and courts eventually led to the
enactment of self-protective and retaliatory legislation by America's
trading partners.6 8
B. A Question of Jurisdiction: Antitrust Laws vs. the Shipping Act
of 1916
The international shipping industry first became embroiled in
the controversy concerning extraterritorial application of United
States antitrust laws when uncertainty arose over whether the courts
or the Federal Maritime Commission had jurisdiction to assess pen-
alties in the event a carrier violated the Shipping Act of 1916. Under
section 15 of the 1916 Act,69 any rate-fixing or other preferential or
cooperative conference agreements expressly in conformance with
63. Also, the fact that the United States antitrust laws are criminal statutes creates
problems because (1) "Common Law states generally prefer, and International Law generally
prescribes, limited extraterritorial jurisdiction in matters of criminal law ... " Huntley,
supra note 26, at 215; and because (2) "the panoply of criminal law is not used on [the
European] side of the Atlantic to enforce competition rules." Id.
64. Cira, supra note 5, at 253, 272. See, e.g., Trade Practices Act 1974, Austl. Acts No.
51 (1974), as amended by Austl. Acts No. 63 (1975), Austl. Acts No. 88 (1976), and Austl.
Acts Nos. 81 & 151 (1977); Gesetz geogen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen [Act Against Re-
straints on Competition], 1974 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] 869 (W. Ger.).
65. Id. See supra notes 26 & 34.
66. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL OPERATIONS 6, reprinted in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 27, at 184 (footnote omitted).
67. Cira, supra note 5, at 265. Some assert that the courts should not be involved in this
type of foreign policy decision making. Id. at 269-70. But see Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank
of America, 549 F. 2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) (for discussion of the case see infra note 99).
68. See infra text accompanying notes 1 10-19.
69. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1982).
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the requirements of the Act and approved by the Federal Maritime
Commission were immune from antitrust liability. When an agree-
ment was either not approved by the Commission or one of its provi-
sions fell outside of an already approved arrangement, the issue be-
came whether "the exclusive remedy for such activity [was] an
administrative one under section 22 [of the 1916 Act], or whether
the failure to obtain the requisite section 15 approval subject[ed] the
parties to antitrust liability."70
In the first two important cases involving this issue, United
States Navigation Company v. Cunard S.S. Co.7 1 and Far East
Conference v. United States,72 the Supreme Court found that all
plaintiffs73 were barred from obtaining relief under the antitrust laws
without first resorting to the Federal Maritime Board (now the Fed-
eral Maritime Commission) for a determination of whether the de-
fendants' actions violated section 15 of the Shipping Act.7 ' In the
Cunard case the Court said specifically, "[T]he remedy is that af-
forded by the Shipping Act, which to that extent supersedes the anti-
trust laws." 75
But in Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference,76 the
Supreme Court found that plaintiffs could seek their remedy from
the courts under the antitrust laws, providing the conference agree-
ments or carrier activities at issue were not debatably legal.77 In
Carnation, as in Far East Conference7 8 plaintiff shipper alleged that
although the defendant conference was operating under an agree-
ment approved by the Federal Maritime Commission, it had also im-
plemented a secret price-fixing agreement that went beyond the
bounds of the approved agreement. The Court declared that the ex-
emption from antitrust liability for price-fixing activities that were
lawful under the Shipping Act of 1916 implied that unlawful price-
70. Kryvoruka, supra note 26, at 79.
71. 284 U.S. 474 (1932).
72. 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
73. Note that United States Navigation Company v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474
(1932), involved a private plaintiff and Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570
(1952), involved the federal government as plaintiff.
74. In the Cunard case, plaintiffs alleged the implementation of a dual rate contract
system that had not been filed with the Federal Maritime Board (Commission). See supra note
71. In Far East Conference, an agreement had been filed with and approved by the Board, but
plaintiffs alleged that a dual-rate contract implemented by the Conference fell outside the
bounds of the agreement. See supra note 72.
75. Cunard, 284 U.S. at 485.
76. 383 U.S. 213 (1965).
77. The Court distinguished Carnation from Cunard and Far East Conference on this
point. The agreements in Cunard and Far East Conference, it said, were debatably legal and
as a result the initial decision regarding legality had to be made by the Commission. Carna-
tion, 383 U.S. at 222. Technically, therefore, Cunard and Far East Conference were not re-
versed by Carnation.
78. Far East Conference, 342 U.S. 570.
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fixing activities were not exempt."9 The price-fixing agreement at is-
sue in this case was not even arguably within the bounds of the ap-
proved agreement. Accordingly, the courts had ample jurisdiction to
award the plaintiff treble damages80 without first insisting that the
plaintiff take his case to the Federal Maritime Commission.81
The Supreme Court decision in Carnation significantly ex-
panded the jurisdictional reach of United States antitrust laws. As a
result, international carriers that had previously not been subject to
antitrust liability under the Cunard and Far East Conference deci-
sions found themselves subject to antitrust liability. The. large dam-
ages awarded under antitrust laws contrasted markedly with the
lesser damages awarded for Shipping Act violations.
C. Increased Restrictions on the Grant of Antitrust Immunity
Under the 1916 Act
In 1961 Congress amended section 15 of the Shipping Act of
1916 to allow the Federal Maritime Commission to disapprove any
agreement found to be "contrary to the public interest."82 In a series
of decisions in the 1960's, courts adopted this "public interest stan-
dard" and, in so doing, limited the antitrust immunity granted to
liner conferences. This development, in conjunction with the ex-
panded jurisdictional reach of the antitrust laws, dramatically in-
creased the exposure of carriers engaged in international shipping to
79. Carnation, 383 U.S. at 216-17.
80. Private treble damage actions are particularly objectionable to foreign governments.
"It is one thing for an executive agency of a national government to implement policies which
will disrupt normal diplomatic and commercial relations. It is quite another for the same gov-
ernment to allow its citizens to undertake unsupervised actions which have identical results."
Cira, supra note 5, at 272. See also Pettit & Styles, supra note 8, at 698. A private treble
damage action may raise complex international political and economic issues. Unlike an action
strictly under the control of the United States Government, a private action cannot by its
nature be resolved by intergovernmental accommodation or compromise. Compromise agree-
ments have been reached between the United States and other governments regarding the
extraterritorial application of United States antitrust laws by the United States Government.
See, e.g., Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, United
States-Australia, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 10365, reprinted in [July-Dec.] ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 171, at 36 (July 1, 1982); the 1976 Executive Agreement Be-
tween the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 27 U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No.
8291 (June 23, 1976).
Also, European nations have nothing akin to the American treble damage action. Hunt-
Icy, supra note 26, at 218. Indeed, the British feel such an award to be penal in character
rather than compensatory " 'and consequently consider that in international dealings at least
these [treble-damage] proceedings should be subject to the limitations that we would regard as
appropriate to criminal proceedings.'" Huntley, supra note 26, at 220 (quoting J. Nott, H.C.
(Hansard) col. 1151). See also supra note 63.
81. The Court noted that a private plaintiff had the choice of bringing an action either
under the Shipping Act of 1916 or under the antitrust laws. "This does not suggest that peti-
tioner might have sought recovery under both, but petitioner did have its choice." Carnation,
383 U.S. at 224.
82. Federal Maritime Commission v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S.
238, 243 (1968).
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antitrust liability. This, in turn, brought the United States further in
conflict with generally accepted international shipping policies.
It was in Carnation83 that the Supreme Court first announced
that "the 1916 Act provided the shipping industry with only a 'lim-
ited antitrust exemption.' "84 This limitation was further defined in
1968 in the Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Mari-
time Commission8" in which the Court stated that before granting
antitrust immunity under the Shipping Act of 1916, the Federal
Maritime Commission had the duty to "'scrutinize the agreement to
make sure that the conduct thus legalized [did] not invade the prohi-
bition of the antitrust laws any more than [was] necessary to serve
the purpose of the regulatory statute.' 86
The key decision in the 1960's establishing the "public interest
standard" as the test for assessing a liner conference's immunity
from antitrust laws was Federal Maritime Commission v. Aktie-
bolaget Svenska Amerika Linien.87 In a significant departure from
the past, the Supreme Court in Svenska articulated a new presump-
tion: "Once an antitrust violation is established, this alone will nor-
mally constitute substantial evidence that the agreement is 'contrary
to the public interest' .. "..- Based on this presumption, the Court
adopted the test formulated by the Federal Maritime Commission
shifting the burden to the conference to "'bring forth such facts as
would demonstrate that the . . . rule [in favor of an agreement] was
required by a serious transportation need, necessary to secure impor-
tant public benefits or in furtherance of a valid regulatory purpose of
the Shipping Act.' "89 This "public interest" test was devastating for
the conferences. "Given the nature of conference agreements and
combinations, an opponent of an agreement [had] little difficulty in
83. 383 U.S. 213 (1965).
84. Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 32, at 316, quoting Carnation, 383 U.S. at 219.
85. 390 U.S. 261 (1968).
86. Volkswagenwerk, 390 U.S. at 274 n.21 (quoting lsanbrandtsen Co. v. United States,
211 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1954)). The Volkswagenwerk case involved an agreement between
the carriers in the Pacific Maritime Association to charge an extra amount for their dock-
unloading and warehouse services. The money collected was to be deposited in a fund estab-
lished pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement with the International Longshoremen's
and Warehousemen's Union. The purpose of the fund was to assist longshoremen, displaced
from their jobs by mechanization, to reeducate themselves for different employment. The
Court found that the agreement fell under the 1916 Act. To be lawful under the 1916 Act as
well as immune from antitrust liability the agreement had to be approved by the FMC.
87. 390 U.S. 238 (1968). The Svenska case involved a review of a Federal Maritime
Commission decision disallowing two conference rules restricting the commissions earned by
travel agents dealing with the conference and prohibiting them from dealing with any other
conference. Id.
88. 390 U.S. at 245-46.
89. Svenska, 390 U.S. at 243 (quoting - F.M.C. (1965)). In its opinion, the
Court noted that under the original 1916 Act, the Federal Maritime Commission could disap-
prove an agreement only on three grounds: unjust discrimination; detriment to commerce; or
illegality under one of the specific provisions of the Act.
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shifting the burden to the proponents to counter with the substantial
degree of proof necessary to justify the agreement . "... - By dra-
matically increasing the risk of antitrust liability, the "public inter-
est" test articulated in Svenska posed the greatest threat to the oper-
ation of conferences in the United States trade.9
The last decision in the series of cases decided in the 1960's was
Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines.92 In this case a
New York carrier sued, among others, the Maritime Company of
the Philippines and the five largest Japanese shipping companies
under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.9 The com-
plaint alleged that the companies had set their rates so unreasonably
low that they were detrimental to the commerce of the United States
and therefore in violation of section 18(b)(5) of the 1916 Act.9" The
carriers were operating under an agreement approved by the Federal
Maritime Commission. They therefore argued that, according to sec-
tion 15, once an agreement is approved, new rates could be put into
effect without prior approval of the Commission.93 Notwithstanding
approval by the Commission, the court found that, because the carri-
ers violated section 18(b)(5) of the 1916 Act, their conduct was not
"otherwise in accordance with the law." '96 The carriers were retroac-
tively stripped of antitrust immunity.9 7 Thus, even when an agree-
ment had been approved by the Commission, the extent of antitrust
immunity arising from that approval was uncertain.
D. Imposition of United States Discovery and Enforcement Proce-
dures Abroad in Connection with Antitrust Litigation-the Ultimate
Jurisdictional Transgression
The 1960's court decisions that expanded antitrust jurisdiction
90. Kryvoruka, supra note 26, at 89.
91. Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 32, at 317.
92. 285 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affid on other grounds sub noma., Japan Line,
Ltd. v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969).
93. Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1, 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982)).
94. 46 U.S.C.A. § 817(b)(5) (1982), repealed by 1984 Act § 20(a), 46 U.S.C.A. §
1719(a) (West Supp. 1984). This section stated that rates permitted by conference agreements
could not be so unreasonably low or high "as to be detrimental to the commerce of the United
States." This section of the 1916 Act was repealed by the 1984 Act § 20(a), 46 U.S.C.A. §
1719(a) (West Supp. 1984).
95. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1982). The provision on which the conferences in the Sabre case
relied states: "[Tiariff rates, fares, and charges, and classifications, rules, and regulations ex-
planatory thereof . . . agreed upon by approved conferences, and changes and amendments
thereto, if otherwise in accordance with law, shall be permitted to take effect without prior
approval upon compliance with the publication and filing requirements of .. this title ....
Id. (emphasis added).
96. See emphasized portion of the 1916 Act, supra note 95, 1916 Act § 15, 46 U.S.C. §
814 (1982).
97. Sabre Shipping, 285 F. Supp. at 956. See also Friedmann & Devierno, supra note
32, at 216-17.
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and restricted antitrust immunity brought the "regulatory" approach
of the Federal Maritime Commission into sharper conflict with the
"noninterventionist" approach of the European Economic Commu-
nity, Japan, and other nations.98 In addition, nowhere in these deci-
sions did the courts take into consideration comity or balance the
United States interests involved against those of other nations.99
The ultimate jurisdictional transgression occurred in the late
1970's, however, with the initiation of United States discovery proce-
dures in the North Atlantic Shipping cases100 and the Westinghouse
uranium antitrust litigation.101 These two incidents gave rise to a key
problem in the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust
laws-the application of United States discovery procedures
abroad.102 In response to the United States Department of Justice's
98. Huntley, supra note 26, at 216.
99. This was so even though § 40 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES urged the courts in cases involving international interests
to consider the principle of comity among nations. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965). But see FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 403 (Tent. Draft No. 21,981).
One significant case in 1976 followed the recommendations of the 1965 RESTATEMENT,
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). In this case Judge
Choy advocated a three-part test:
As acknowledged above, the antitrust laws require in the first instance that
there be some effect-actual or intended-on American foreign commerce
before the federal courts may legitimately exercise subject matter jurisdiction
under those statutes. Second, a greater showing of a burden or restraint may be
necessary to demonstrate that the effect is sufficiently large to present a cogniza-
ble injury to the plaintiffs and, therefore, a civil violation of the antitrust laws.
• ..Third, there is the additional question which is unique to the international
setting of whether the interests of, and links to, the United States-including the
magnitude of the effect on American foreign commerce-are sufficiently strong,
vis-A-vis those of other nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial
authority.
Id. at 613 (emphasis added).
Judge Choy's analysis in Timberlane Lumber was cited in dicta in Mannington Mills, Inc.
v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979), but it was not adopted in the uranium
antitrust litigation that followed. See In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138
(N.D.ll. 1979), affd, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). See generally infra note 101 and accom-
panying text. Both the district court in the In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation case and the
Canadians expressed the fear that the Timberlane Lumber decision would plunge American
courts into the realm of diplomacy. Blair, The Canadian Experience, in PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 27, at 67; In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. at 1147. See supra text
accompanying note 67.
100. See supra note 9.
101. In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, [1978] 1 All
E.R. 434, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 38 (1978). Westinghouse entered into con-
tracts with several utility companies to supply them with uranium. The price of uranium sub-
sequently skyrocketed and Westinghouse was sued by sixteen utility companies when it notified
them that it would not be able to fulfill the contracts. In its own defense, Westinghouse alleged
that the formation of a cartel, involving forty companies of which twenty-six were Canadian,
Australian, South African, French or English, had driven the price of uranium up and made
the performance of the contracts commercially impracticable. See Westinghouse, I All E.R. at
451, 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 44-45 (opinion of Viscount Dilhorne); Hacking, The In-
creasing Extraterritorial Impact of U.S. Laws: A Cause for Concern Amongst Friends of
America, reprinted in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 27, at 165 [hereinafter cited as Hacking].
102. Hacking, supra note 101, at 163. ("Of all activities, . . . the most conspicuous and
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issuance of Civil Investigatory Demands on the British shipping
companies involved in the.North Atlantic investigation, Great Brit-
ain's Under-Secretary of State for Trade told Parliament that he
considered such a "disclosure" to be an infringement of the United
Kingdom's jurisdiction. 10 - The Attorney General of England and
Wales intervened in the Westinghouse litigation and argued to the
House of Lords that the letters rogatory °4 issued by a United States
District Court to the High Court of England demanding disclosure
of documents of a certain British company amounted to an invasion
of United Kingdom sovereignty.1"5
Notwithstanding the furor that arose over the Civil Investigative
Demands in the North Atlantic Shipping case, the Department of
Justice on June 1, 1979, obtained a criminal indictment of seven cor-
porations (four American and three foreign) and thirteen of their
executives, including six non-United States citizens. The indictment
was for entering into agreements between 1971 and 1975 to "fix,
raise, stabilize and maintain price levels for the shipment of freight
in the United States/Europe trade."10 On June 8, 1979, the defen-
dants pleaded nolo contendere and the court imposed fines totalling
6.1 million dollars; "the largest fines ever assessed in one antitrust
case." 107 Following this judgment, more than thirty treble damage
complaints were filed and eventually settled.108 The Federal Mari-
time Commission also initiated proceedings to investigate the same
defendants for Shipping Act violations.10 9
the greatest source of trouble, has been with the attempts to apply the U.S. discovery proce-
dures abroad.") The problems surrounding the extensive discovery procedures of the United
States were considered at the 1970 Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444 [hereinafter cited as Hague
Convention].
103. Hacking, supra note 101, at 163-64 (referring to Stanly Clinton Davis' comment to
the House of Commons. H.C. (Hansard), Nov. 1976.).
104. These letters rogatory were issued pursuant to the 1970 Hague Convention on Tak-
ing of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters. See Hague Convention, supra note
102. Both Great Britain and the United States ratified the Convention. See PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 27, at 30-31.
105. Silkin, The Perspective of the Attorney General of England and Wales, in PER-
SPECTIVES, supra note 27, at 31-32. Under the provisions of the Hague Convention, a state
could refuse to honor a letter rogatory if it felt its sovereignty or security would be threatened
by the execution. Hague Convention, supra note 102.
The House of Lords refused to give effect to the letters rogatory in the Westinghouse
case. Westinghouse, [19781 1 All. E.R. 434 at 438.
106. In re Ocean Shipping Antitrust Litigation, 500 F. Supp. 1235, 1238 (1980) (quot-
ing United States v. Atlantic Container Line, Ltd., No. 79-271, §§ 33, 34 (D.D.C. filed June
1, 1979)).
107. Cira, supra note 5, at 251; In re Ocean Shipping Antitrust Litigation, 500 F. Supp.
at 1238. See British Threaten Retaliation Over Shipping Antitrust Judgments, [July-Dec.]
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 922, at A-31 (July 12, 1979).
108. These claims were consolidated and settled as a class action for approximately $5.4
million. In re Ocean Shipping Antitrust Litigation, 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 164,585
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 1982).
109. In re Unfiled Agreements in the North Atlantic Trades, No. 79-83 (F.M.C. filed
Aug. 14, 1979; discontinued June, 1984). The Commission proceedings were not acted upon
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Such extraterritorial application of United States laws infuri-
ated foreign governments. To protect their sovereignty and their citi-
zens, they retaliated by enacting blocking legislation.
E. Foreign Government Reaction
The Westinghouse case may be credited with turning British
opinion against American antitrust discovery and enforcement proce-
dures. 110 When combined with the unprecedented fines imposed in
the North Atlantic Shipping cases, this opinion was converted into
action. In 1980 Parliament passed The Protection of Trading Inter-
ests Act,1 ' a blocking statute, containing
three basic elements: (1) expanded authority to block foreign
discovery requests; (2) new authority to bar enforcement in Brit-
ish courts of foreign judgments for multiple damages against
British defendants; and (3) a unique 'claw-back"' 2 provision
which allows qualifying British companies to recover in British
courts the 'punitive' portion of any foreign multiple damages
judgement entered against them."'
The British Parliament was not alone in resorting to a blocking stat-
ute. Canada passed Uranium Information Security Regulations in
1976.1" Australia passed the Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restric-
tion of Enforcement) Act 1979" 5 in response to another set of letters
rogatory from Westinghouse Electric Corporation."' New Zealand
until the settlement of the private claims at which time the case was reactivated. In May,
1984, pursuant to a motion to dismiss, the August 1979 Order of Investigation was condition-
ally discontinued by the Commission. Conditions stated in the Commission's Order of Condi-
tional Discontinuance dated May 1984 were fulfilled and the investigatory action against the
North Atlantic shipping conferences was discontinued in June, 1984. Telephone interview with
Bruce A. Dombrowski, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Federal Maritime Commission (Feb. 7,
1985).
110. Cira, supra note 5, at 250.
111. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. II.
112. "The claw-back is a retaliatory measure aimed primarily at American antitrust
treble damage actions." Cira, supra note 5, at 249.
113. Cira, supra note 5, at 248-49, referring to §§ 2, 5, and 6 of the Protection of
Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 1I. Note that the protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980
repeals and replaces the Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, ch. 87.
The latter was passed in 1964 expressly in response to the claims of the Federal Maritime
Commission that it had the power to inspect on demand the documents of members of ap-
proved conferences, no matter where located and no matter whether in response to a legal
proceeding or not. See Hacking, supra note 101, at 162-63; Huntley, supra note 26, at 221.
114. Uranium Information Security Regulations, CAN. STAT. 0. & REGS. 76-644
(1976), replaced by CAN. STAT. 0. & REos. 77-836 (1977). This was not Canada's first block-
ing statute aimed at American antitrust actions. See, e.g., Act of Dec. 15, 1975 ch. 76 (1974-
1976) Can. Stat. 1535, amending Combines Investigation Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-23
(1970); Business Records Protection Act, I ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 54 (1970) (originally passed
in 1947); Business Concerns Records Act, 1958, QuE. REV. STAT. ch. 279 (1964). See gener-
ally Cira, supra note 5, at 258-59.
115. Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act 1979, Austl. Acts
No. 13.
116. Cira, supra note 5, at 253.
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passed its own blocking statute.17 when it was notified of another
ocean shipping investigation by the Justice Department." 8 Even
France, which had no special need for a blocking statute during the
uranium litigation, took note of the problems encountered by other
countries and in 1980 passed its Law Concerning the Communica-
tion of Documents or Information of an Economic, Commercial, In-
dustrial, Financial, or Technical Nature to Aliens Whether Natural
or Artificial Persons." 9
In brief, this was the situation that Congress faced when it sat
down to revise the Shipping Act of 1916. Whether drafted in direct
response to antitrust liabilities placed on foreign shippers or as the
result of some other antitrust action, the foreign blocking statutes
effectively immunized foreign shippers from United States antitrust
fines while United States shippers bore the full force of such fines. In
addition, United States laws continued to conflict with the laws of
other countries. Other countries believed, and the economic realities
of the liner industry indicated, that basic antitrust assumptions did
not work in the context of the liner industry.' Increased efficiency
and increased harmony with the laws of other nations required a
change in the Shipping Act of 1916.
IV. The Shipping Act of 1984
As indicated by the Declaration of Policy segment of the new
Act,'' the intent of Congress in drafting the new legislation was to
bring United States shipping policy in harmony with international
shipping practices. But, by stating that such harmony would be
117. Evidence Amendment Act (No. 2), N.Z. Stat. No. 27 (1980).
118. Cira, supra note 5, at 256.
119. Law Concerning the Communication of Documents or Information of an Eco-
nomic, Commercial, Industrial, Financial, or Technical Nature to Aliens Whether Natural or
Artificial Persons, No. 80-538, 1980 J.O. 1799 [France]. See also Cira, supra note 5, at 257.
120. Both the JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, and the MERCHANT
MARINE AND FISHERIES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, also noted with some alarm that
the requisite number of nations had ratified a liner code of conduct developed by the United
Nations Conference on Trade & Development, 2 United Nations Conference of the Plenipo-
tentiaries on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences (Final Act), U.N. Doc. TD/CODE/
13/Add.l (1975) (entered into force Oct. 6, 1983). The Code provides for a multilateral regu-
latory mechanism for liner conferences. The United States has not acceded to the Code, feel-
ing it will disadvantage United States-flag commercial carrier operations as cross-traders. See
H.R. REP. No. 600, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1984), reprinted in 1"984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 295 [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT]. This Comment
does not deal with the question of whether United States law is in greater harmony with the
provisions of the Liner Code since the passage of the Shipping Act of 1984 than it was under
the 1916 Act. See Larsen & Vetterick, supra note 11; Lopatin, The UNCTAD Code of Con-
duct for Liner Conferences: Time for a United States Response, 22 HARV. INT'L L. J. 355
(1981).
121. 1984 Act § 2(2), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1701(2) (West Supp. 1984). ("The purposes of
this chapter are- . (2) to provide an efficient and economic transportation system in the
ocean commerce of the United States that is, insofar as possible, in harmony with, and respon-
sive to, international shipping practices .... "). See also supra note 3.
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achieved only "insofar as possible,"'22 Congress reserved discretion
to retain some of the competition oriented characteristics of the 1916
Act. The resulting statute is substantially responsive to international
shipping policies and the concerns of foreign nations regarding extra-
territorial application of United States antitrust and shipping legisla-
tion. Some aspects of the new Shipping Act, however, are still in
conflict with international shipping norms.
A. Provisions Responsive to International Shipping Practices
1. Conference Agreements.-Harmonizing United States ship-
ping policy with international shipping practices necessitated limit-
ing extraterritorial application of United States antitrust laws by ex-
panding antitrust immunity for carriers involved in United States
trades. The two portions of the new Act most responsible for effectu-
ating this expansion are section 6,123 which alters the substantive and
procedural approach of the government in reviewing multicarrier
agreements, and section 7,124 which, inter alia, broadens antitrust
immunity and eliminates the right of private parties to bring treble
damage actions. 12 5
The substantive change set forth in section 6 involves an altera-
tion of the general standard used by the Federal Maritime Commis-
sion for reviewing conference agreements. As will be recalled, the
Svenska decision' 2 required that multicarrier agreements satisfy the
"public interest" test required by section 15 of the 1916 Act.' This
test was exceptionally difficult to pass because it (1) assumed that
agreements between carriers were per se contrary to the public inter-
est; and (2) placed the burden of proof upon the proponents of an
agreement to show that the benefits to the public warranted ap-
proval. Section 6(g) 128 of the new Act eliminates the "public inter-
est" test and replaces it with a "substantially anticompetitive" test.
Section 6(h) 129 shifts the burden of proof to the Commission when
an action to enjoin operation of an agreement is brought in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 30 This
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1705 (West Supp. 1984).
124. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1706 (West Supp. 1984).
125. The two sections of the 1984 Act work in conjunction with § 4, 46 U.S.C.A. § 1703
(West Supp. 1984), defining the types of agreements covered by the Act, and § 5, 46 U.S.C.A.
§ 1704 (West Supp. 1984), detailing those items that must be included in each agreement.
The effect is to expand antitrust exemptions from antitrust liability and bring United States
shipping policy closer to that followed internationally.
126. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
127. 1916 Act § 15, 46 U.S.C.A. § 814 (1982).
128. 1984 Act § 6(g), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1705(g) (West Supp. 1984).
129. 1984 Act § 6(h), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1705(h) (West Supp. 1984).
130. Under § 6(h), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1705(h) (West Supp. 1984), the FMC no longer has
the power to enjoin an agreement itself. If it feels that an agreement either violates the new
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new general standard
responds to the Senate concern that the 'public interest' test in
the [Shipping Act of 1916 was] vague and unworkable in its
automatic application of certain antitrust principles to ocean
shipping. The new standard removes any per se condemnation of
concerted conduct such as might be applied under the antitrust
laws.13 1
Section 6(g), entitled "Substantially anticompetitive agree-
ments," specifically states:
If, at any time after the filing or effective date of an agree-
ment, the Commission determines that the agreement is likely,
by a reduction in competition, to produce an unreasonable re-
duction in transportation service or an unreasonable increase in
transportation cost, it may, after notice to the person filing the
agreement, seek appropriate injunctive relief under subsection
(h) of this section. 1 3
Although this "substantially anticompetitive" test gives less weight
to antitrust policy and greater deference to carrier agreements, it
still suggests that the Federal Maritime Commission is to place some
focus on competition. The determination of how much of a decrease
in transportation service or increase in transportation cost is neces-
sary before it becomes "unreasonable" is to be made in accordance
with the following three-part test set forth in the legislative history
to the statute.1
33
The Federal Maritime Commission must determine first
whether a conference agreement is likely to cause a substantial re-
duction in competition.'" If not, the Commission is prohibited from
interceding. The Committee reasoned that if anticompetitive conduct
is insubstantial, any reduction in service or increase in cost would
not be unreasonable.3 5 The Committee also stated that when judg-
ing an agreement's effect on competition, the Commission must con-
sider "whether the relevant competitive market includes more than
just ocean common carriers providing direct service in a trade.""'
For example, alternate liner routings, bulk carriers, charter opera-
general standard or does not comport with the more technical requirements of § 4, 46
U.S.C.A. § 1703 (West Supp. 1984), or § 5, 46 U.S.C.A. § 1704 (West Supp. 1984), it must
bring an action for an injunction before the United States District Court of the District of
Columbia. As stated in the text, the Commission must also bear the burden of proof before the
district court.
131. CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 120, at 32, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 288.
132. 1984 Act § 6(g), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1705(g) (West Supp. 1984).
133. CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 120.
134. Id. at 34, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 290.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 35, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 291.
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tors, or air freight carriers could provide shippers with alternate and
perhaps less expensive methods of transporting their goods.137
Second, if the agreement does cause a substantial reduction in
competition, it must also cause a "material and meaningful" reduc-
tion in service or increase in cost to shippers. To be "material and
meaningful" specific evidence of adverse impact must be shown. 138
This evidentiary requirement is demonstrative of the new govern-
ment perception that carrier agreements are not per se anticom-
petitive.1 39
Third, whenever an agreement causing a reduction in competi-
tion is both substantial as well as material and meaningful, the po-
tential benefits of the agreement must then be considered. These
benefits may include an increased ability to control rate instability or
overcapacity, increased economic efficiency, and, significantly, the
favorable impact an agreement may have on United States foreign
policy or international comity. 40
The Conference Committee Report further states in reference to
section 6(g) that "[tihe language of this subsection must be inter-
preted in light of the historic international acceptance of carrier con-
ference agreements."""1 Clearly, the new general standard developed
by the Conferees is intended to favor formation of liner confer-
ences-a significant change from the approach under the 1916 Act,
and one more in line with internationally accepted shipping
practices.
The procedural changes delineated by section 6 concern the fil-
ing and effective dates of conference agreements. These alterations
also contribute to expanded antitrust immunity.
Under the provisions of the 1916 Act,1 42 agreements were not
effective until approved by the Federal Maritime Commission. Carri-
ers who operated as part of a conference pursuant to a filed agree-
ment before the Commission rendered a decision were subject to an-
titrust liability regardless of whether the conference agreement was
subsequently approved. No time limit for rendering a decision was
placed on the Commission.
137. Id. See also supra note 50.
138. Id. See also Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 32, at 328.
139. Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 32, at 328.
140. CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 120, at 35-36, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 291-92. ("Another possible benefit to be considered by the Commission
is the impact of an agreement on U.S. foreign policy and international comity. The Conferees
agree that the United States should act with sensitivity to the interests of its trading partners
when administering shipping regulation."). See also Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 32, at
328.
141. CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 120, at 33, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 289.
142. 1916 Act § 15, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1982).
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These restrictions are removed under section 6(b) a14  of the new
Act. An agreement automatically becomes effective within forty-five
days of filing (or thirty days after notice is published by the Com-
mission in the Federal Register, whichever is later),1 4 unless the
Commission takes action within that period to reject the agree-
ment.14 5 This means that conduct undertaken pursuant to a filed and
effective agreement is lawful conduct protected from antitrust liabil-
ity even without express approval from the Federal Maritime Com-
mission or proof from the proponent that the agreement would be
beneficial to the "public interest."146 Also, creation of a time limit
within which the Commission must act encourages conference agree-
ments because it increases the certainty surrounding their formation.
Carriers now know within a short period of time whether their
planned course of conduct will be exempt from antitrust liability.14 7
2. Antitrust Exemptions.-As under the 1916 Act, carrier
conduct undertaken pursuant to an effective agreement1 4 8 is exempt
from antitrust liability. Three additional exemptions, however, have
been established under the new Act. These will significantly broaden
total carrier exemption.
The first of these is outlined in section 7(a)(2). " 9 Under this
provision, antitrust laws may not be applied to any activity or agree-
143. 1984 Act § 6(b), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1705(b) (West Supp. 1984).
144. The Federal Maritime Commission must transfer notice of the filing of an agree-
ment to the Federal Register within seven days of the filing. Donovan, The Shipping Act of
1984, 51 I.C.C. PRAC. J. 463, 466-67 (1984)[hereinafter cited as Donovan].
145. An agreement may be rejected if it does not list those items outlined in § 5, 46
U.S.C.A. § 1704 (West Supp. 1984), if it does not fall within the scope of the Act as defined
in § 4, 46 U.S.C.A. § 1703 (West Supp. 1984), or if it does not satisfy the general standard
mentioned in § 6(g), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1705(g) (West Supp. 1984) and detailed in the legislative
history. See supra text accompanying notes 134-40. Although not explicitly stated in the 1984
Act, there is also reason to believe that an agreement will be rejected if it is contrary to one of
the prohibitions listed in § 10, 46 U.S.C.A § 1709 (West Supp. 1984).
146. MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 17,
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 182.
147. Once an agreement goes into effect, the Act also provides that the FMC may inves-
tigate conduct occurring pursuant to that agreement. If such conduct is found to violate § 5 of
the 1984 Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 1704 (West Supp. 1984), the Commission may disapprove, can-
cel, or modify the agreement. If the conduct violates the general standard in § 6(g), 46
U.S.C.A. § 1705(g) (West Supp. 1984), of the Act, however, the Commission's sole remedy is
under § 6(h), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1705(h) (West Supp. 1984), which authorizes the Commission to
bring an action before the district court to enjoin the agreement. See generally section 9, 46
U.S.C.A. § 1710 (West Supp. 1984); Donovan, supra note 144, at 473; MERCHANT MARINE
AND FISHERIES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 11-12, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 176-77. An agreement already in effect remains in effect during the investigation
unless enjoined under § 7(h), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1706(h) -(West Supp. 1984). See § 9(c), 46
U.S.C.A. § 1708(c) (West Supp. 1984). See also MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES COM-
MITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 31-32, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 196-97.
148. Under the 1916 Act, an agreement had to be "approved" before the parties to it
were protected from antitrust liability. 1916 Act, supra note 4, at 46 U.S.C. § 814. Under the
new Act, this is no longer true. See also supra text accompanying note 143.
149. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1706 (a)(2) (West Supp. 1984).
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ment which falls within the scope of the new Act and which was
entered into upon the reasonable belief that it was in accordance
with an effective agreement filed with the Commission, or exempt
under section 16150 from the filing requirements. This exemption
from antitrust liability applies even when the conduct is prohibited
under the chapter so long as the parties can satisfy the "reasonable
belief' defense. 15 1
The second provision, section 7(c)(2), 52 prohibits private par-
ties from seeking a remedy under the antitrust laws for violations of
the Shipping Act. 153 This eliminates private treble damage action.
This section is a major departure from prior United States shipping
law and, at least on this point, brings the United States directly in
line with international policy.'1 The Judiciary Committee rational-
ized this change in policy by stating that because the application of
competitive principles to conference configurations frequently in-
volves the sensitivities of foreign governments and complex economic
issues, such matters were best left to the expertise of the Federal
Maritime Commission. 55 Congress thereby eliminated one of the
primary objections to the extraterritorial application of United
States antitrust laws by relieving carriers from the threat of private
treble damage actions.
The third new exemption from antitrust liability appears in sec-
tion 7(c)(1). 156 Under this provision, when a new determination by
an agency or a court strips a particular conference activity of anti-
trust immunity, neither the agency nor the court may hold the con-
ference retroactively liable under the antitrust laws for participating
in that activity. Thus, if a situation arose, as it did in the Sabre
150. Id. at § 1715.
151. Under this new reasonable basis test, the outcome in Carnation, 383 U.S. 213
(1965), would have been reversed if the defendants could have proven that they had a reasona-
ble basis to conclude that their new rate agreement was within the bounds of an existing and
effective agreement. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
152. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1706(c)(2) (West Supp. 1984). ("(c) Limitations ...(2) No per-
son may recover damages under section 15 of Title 15, or obtain injunctive relief under section
26 of Title 15, for conduct prohibited by this chapter.").
153. Id. See also Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 32, at 334; MERCHANT MARINE
AND FISHERIES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 33, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 198.
154. See supra note 80 (private treble damage actions).
155. JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 12, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 232. Regarding private actions the Judiciary Committee also noted the
following:
[t]he excessive cost and delay surrounding such litigation are major reasons
for the current legislative reform efforts. The cost of such delays to the ocean
carriers, their shipping customers, and the ultimate consuming public will be
reflected in delayed or diminished investment, higher legal and regulatory costs,
and fewer entrants into a trade, all of which translate into higher bills or dimin-
ished service for the consumer.
Id.
156. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1706(c)(1) (West Supp. 1984).
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Shipping case, 157 in which a court determines that a carrier operat-
ing under the terms of an agreement filed with the Commission is
not immune from the antitrust laws, that carrier would be protected
from liability for any activity conducted prior to the decision. 158 The
rationale behind this provision was "'to provide a degree of stability
and certainty to an agreement filed in good faith and valid on its
face.' "9159
Although antitrust immunity has been broadened by the three
new provisions detailed above, it is not absolute. Carriers operating
under a conference agreement that has not been properly filed with
the Commission are as open to antitrust sanctions under the new Act
as they were under the 1916 Act. 60 Likewise, parties to an agree-
ment who did not have a reasonable basis to believe that their con-
duct was in accordance with an effective agreement or exempt from
filing requirements will not be able to hide behind the section
7(a)(2) defense.' Under section 5(b)(5), unprotected conduct in-
cludes conduct that is predatory or constitutes an unreasonable re-
fusal to deal.' 6 Antitrust liability in all the above situations, how-
ever, still does not subject the violators to private antitrust suits.
Private suits are prohibited for all purposes under section 7(c)(2).163
Additional exemptions provided for by the Act which may be of
particular interest to foreign governments and carriers include ex-
emptions for activities that occur either outside the United States or
between foreign countries. For example, section 7(a)(3)' immu-
nizes any agreement or activity within the scope of the Act that re-
lates to transportation services within or between foreign countries,
regardless of any connection with the United States. 6 5 Section
7(a)(4) also exempts any activity concerning the foreign inland seg-
157. See Sabre Shipping, supra note 92; notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
158. Compare Sabre Shipping. id., with National Association of Recycling v. Am. Mail
Line, 720 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1983) (in this proceeding occurring after legislative process had
been instituted to change the 1916 Act, the Ninth Circuit expressly refused to follow Sabre
Shipping and instead took the stance now found in the 1984 Act § 7(c)(l), 46 U.S.C.A. §
1706(c)(1) (West Supp. 1984)), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1616 (1984)).
159. MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 33,
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 198. See also Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 32,
at 334.
160. 1984 Act § 5, 46 U.S.C.A. § 1704 (West Supp. 1984)..
161. See supra text accompanying note 151.
162. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1704(b)(5). See also Donovan, supra note 144, at 469; Friedmann
& Devierno, supra note 32, at 333.
163. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1706(c)(2). CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 120, at
28-29, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 284-85; MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 12, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 177.
164. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1706(a)(3) (West Supp. 1984).
165. The § 7(a)(3) immunity is conditioned on the agreement or activity not having a
"direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on the commerce of the United States."
Id.
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ment of United States export or import trade.16 Last, any agree-
ment to provide or furnish wharfage, dock, warehouse, or other ter-
minal facilities outside the United States is not subject to United
States antitrust laws. 167
3. Discovery Procedures.-One of the major points of conten-
tion in the North Atlantic Shipping cases, as well as in the non-
shipping Westinghouse case, was the extraterritorial application of
United States discovery procedures. Although the Commission is still
empowered to regulate the discovery and subpoena process and issue
discovery orders on its own behalf,"6 8 two provisions have been added
to the Shipping Act of 1984 that should alleviate the tension caused
by the conflict between United States discovery rules and foreign
discovery practices.
Both of these provisions are contained in section 13, the "Penal-
ties" section of the Act. This is the same section that authorizes the
Commission to sanction carriers who violate a subpoena or discovery
order. Section 13(b)(4) 69 deals specifically with a situation in which
a carrier is unable to comply with a discovery order because of a
blocking statute. If this occurs, the Commission is required to notify
the Secretary of State, 17 0 who must then "promptly consult with the
government of the nation within which the documents or information
are alleged to be located for the purpose of assisting the Commission
in obtaining the documents or information sought. 17 1 This section
illustrates Congressional recognition that foreign governments may
not conform with United States law, and that United States courts
and administrative agencies should attempt other methods before
imposing their procedures on foreign jurisdictions.
One issue that may arise under section 13(b)(4) that is not
dealt with in either the statute or the regulations is whether a carrier
166. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1706(a)(4) (West Supp. 1984).
167. 1984 Act § 7(a)(5), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1706(a)(5) (West Supp. 1984).
168. The new Shipping Act still authorizes use of discovery procedures in accordance
with regulations issued by the Federal Maritime Commission. See id. at § 12, 46 U.S.C.A. at
§ 1711 (West Supp. 1984).
Further, the regulations recently promulgated by the Commission make it clear that the
Commission's subpoena and discovery powers are intended for use outside United States terri-
tory if necessary. See 49 Fed. Reg. 44,390 (1984) (to be codified at 46 C.F.R. § 502.202),
(directly addressing the taking of depositions abroad); 49 Fed. Reg. 44,393 (1984) (to be
codified at 46 C.F.R. § 502.210(c)), (addressing refusal to comply with Commission orders
directed to persons or documents located in a foreign country).
In addition, 1984 Act § 13(b)(2), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1712(b)(2) (West Supp. 1984), and 49
Fed. Reg. 44,393 (1984) (to be codified at 46 C.F.R. § 502.210(a)) empower the Commission,
after notice and hearing, to sanction a carrier for noncompliance by suspending any or all
tariffs charged by the carrier or revoking the carrier's right to use any or all tariffs approved
for the conference(s) of which it is a member.
169. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1712(b)(4) (West Supp. 1984).
170. Id.
171. Id. See also 49 Fed. Reg. 45,406 (1984) (to be codified at 46 C.F.R. § 587.1-87.9).
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who is unable to comply with a discovery order because of a blocking
statute will be penalized under section 13(b)(2) t7 2 in the event the
Secretary of State is unsuccessful in persuading a foreign govern-
ment to release the documents or information requested. An infor-
mal response from the Federal Maritime Commission affirmed the
possibility that sanctions would be imposed. 173 A representative of
the Commission stated that the Commission hoped the matter would
be solved diplomatically before the question of sanctions arose.
In raising the possibility of a diplomatic solution, the Commis-
sion representative was referring not only to the actions of the Secre-
tary of State, but also to the provisions of section 13(b)(6) 17 ' which
states: "Before an order under this subsection becomes effective, it
shall be immediately submitted to the President who may, within 10
days after receiving it, disapprove the order if the President finds
that disapproval is required by reasons of the national defense or the
foreign policy of the United States. ''1 75 This is the second of the two
discovery procedures outlined in the new Act that, if exercised, will
alleviate the political tensions caused by the extraterritorial applica-
tion of United States discovery procedures. Like section 13(b)(4),
the ultimate check provided by section 13(b)(6) illustrates a Con-
gressional recognition that did not exist in the 1916 Act of the im-
portance of international comity.
4. Prohibitions Replacing the "Detriment to Commerce"
Standard.-Under section 15 of the 1916 Shipping Act, the Federal
Maritime Commission was authorized to disapprove any conference
agreement found "to operate to the detriment of the commerce of
172. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1712(b)(2) (West Supp. 1984).
173. Telephone interview with Bruce A. Dombrowski Assistant Secretary, U.S. Federal
Maritime Commission (Feb. 7, 1985). In response to a formal request for an opinion from the
Commission regarding this issue, Mr. Dombrowski sent the following reply:
This responds to your [question] . . . regarding the assessment of penalties
against common carriers who fail to respond to a subpoena due to allegations of
foreign government interference. Specifically, you have asked if, in the event the
Secretary of State's diplomatic efforts fail, the carrier would be penalized under
section 13 (b)(2) of the Shipping Act of 1984 (the Act).
As you are aware, neither the Act nor the Commission's Rules of Practice
and Procedure (46 CFR 502) explicitly answer this question. I have discussed
the matter with the Commission's General Counsel, and we have determined
that a definitive answer simply cannot be given. If a situation as you address
should arise, the Commission would necessarily have to make an ad hoc determi-
nation as to the assessment of penalties, based on all attendant circumstances.
The involved carrier would naturally remain subject to the specified penalties,
but the Commission would be required to examine all involved factors before
implementing its discretionary authority. Although consistency and equal treat-
ment would be a primary objective in such matters, each specific situation would
be controlled by its unique set of circumstances.
Letter from Bruce A. Dombrowski to the author (Mar. 8, 1985) (copy on file with the Dickin-
son Journal of International Law).
174. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1712(b)(6) (West Supp. 1984).
175. Id.
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the United States . . . . 17 Likewise, section 18(b)(5) enabled the
Commission to "disapprove any rate or charge filed by a common
carrier .. .which ...it [found] to be so unreasonably high or low
as to be detrimental to the commerce of the United States. 1 77 It
was the Federal Maritime Commission itself that brought the vague-
ness 178 of this "detriment to commerce" standard to the attention of
those responsible for revising the 1916 Act. Following the Commis-
sion's recommendation, the revising committees analyzed the deci-
sions of the Commission and consolidated the holdings into three
concrete prohibitions. These prohibitions replaced the "detriment to
commerce" standard. They read as follows:.
No conference or group of two or more common carriers
may
(1) boycott or take any other concerted action re-
sulting in an unreasonable refusal to deal;
(2) engage in conduct that unreasonably restricts
the use of intermodal services or technological
innovations;
(3) engage in any predatory practice designed to
eliminate the participation, or deny the entry, in a par-
ticular trade of a common carrier not a member of the
conference, a group of common carriers, an ocean
tramp, or a bulk carrier; .... 179
This clarification reduces the confusion surrounding the original
"detrimental to commerce" standard, and contributes to the stability
and efficiency of conference activity in the United States.
5. Declaration of Policy.-The 1984 Act's Declaration of Pol-
icy indicates Congressional intent to bring the United States in line
with international shipping practices.180 No such intent was declared
in the 1916 Act. Indeed, the 1916 Act contained no statement of
policy to guide either the Federal Maritime Commission or the
courts in their determinations. Just how often the Commission will
resort to the policy statement in interpreting the Act remains to be
seen. It is likely, however, that the statement will compel the Com-
mission to be more sympathetic to shipping policies of other
nations. 8'
176. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1982).
177. 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(5)-(1982), repealed by 1984 Act § 20(a), 46 U.S.C.A. §
1719(a) (West Supp. 1984).
178. See, e.g., Sabre Shipping, supra note 92 and accompanying text.
179. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1709(c)(l)-(3) (West Supp. 1984).
180. 1984 Act § 2(2), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1701(2) (West Supp. 1984). See also supra note
121.
181. The Senate Commerce Committee made clear that the Declaration of Policy provi-
sions were to "'guide interpreters in determining Congressional intent and the Commission in
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B. Provisions Conflicting with International Shipping Practices
1. Penalties. (a) Penalties for blocking United States-flag ves-
sel access to foreign trade.-Of all the provisions in the 1984 Act
contrary to international shipping practices, section 13(b)(5) 182 is
most likely to have a negative impact on foreign relations. It
provides:
If, after notice and hearing, the Commission finds that the
action of a common carrier, acting alone or in concert with any
person, or a foreign government has duly impaired access of a
vessel documented under the law of the United States to ocean
trade between foreign ports, the Commission shall take action
that it finds appropriate ....'83
Factors indicating conditions unduly impairing access may include:
closed conferences;184 deferred rebates; 185 reservation of a substantial
portion of total cargo in trade to national-flag or other vessels;1 6 or
discriminatory imposition of fees or charges on United States-flag
vessels.187 In a departure from the 1916 Act, it is no longer neces-
sary for the Commission to find that carriers or foreign governments
are guilty of an unfair practice specified under the new Act.
A conflict of laws problem will arise in situations in which ac-
tions by foreign governments or carriers impairing the United
States-flag trades are perfectly legal in those countries or when those
actions are in conformity with international shipping practices. Con-
gress did anticipate this problem and dealt with it by providing, in
section 13(b)(6),188 that before any order under subsection 13(b) be-
promulgating rules and regulations.'" Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 32, at 322-23 (quot-
ing S. REP. No. 3, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1983)).
182. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1712(b)(5) (West Supp. 1984).
183. Id. According to the MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES COMMITTEE REPORT, this
provision
makes the language [of the Act] protect U.S. economic interest vis-i-vis the
recent maritime policy decisions of OECD Maritime nations. Particularly, in
discussions with OECD nations regarding the European Economics Commu-
nity's accession to the UNCTAD Code, the United States delegations have in-
sisted on protecting the rights of access to U.S. carriers to trades where the Code
will apply.
MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 23, 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 188. For more regarding the UNCTAD Liner Code, see supra
note 120.
184. 49 Fed. Reg. 45,407 (1984) (to be codified at 46 C.F.R. § 587.2(c)).
185. Id.
186. 49 Fed. Reg. 45,407 (1984) (to be codified at 46 C.F.R. § 587.2(b)). United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Development, 2 U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on a
Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences (Final Act) at 2, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE/13/Add.I
(1975).
187. 49 Fed. Reg. 45,407 (1984) (to be codified at 46 C.F.R. § 587.2(a)). See also
generally 49 Fed. Reg. 45,407 (1984) (to be codified at 46 C.F.R. § 587.2).
188. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1712(b)(6) (West Supp. 1984). See also 49 Fed. Reg. 45,408
(1984) (to be codified at 46 C.F.R. § 587.8).
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comes effective it must be sent to the President "who may, within 10
days after receipt of it, disapprove the order if the President finds
that disapproval is required for reasons of the national defense or the
foreign policy of the United States."189
It is not possible at this time, however, to foretell how often the
President will choose to act under section 13(b)(6). If he does not,
and the Federal Maritime Commission takes the stringent actions it
is empowered to take, the negative impact on United States foreign
relations could be as substantial as that created by the extraterrito-
rial application of the United States antitrust laws.
(b) Awards to private parties.-Although section 7(c)(2) 190 of
the 1984 Act proscribes private treble damage actions. under the an-
titrust laws, section 11'9' permits private parties injured by a viola-
tion of the new Shipping Act (other than a violation of the general
standard) 192 to obtain reparations. 93 In addition, section 11 (g) actu-
ally expands the remedies previously allowed private plaintiffs under
the Shipping Act of 1916 by permitting the court to award up to
double the amount of damages for violations of six expressly prohib-
ited acts. 9 4 These double damages, plus interest calculated at com-
mercial rates of interest from the date of injury, are intended to de-
ter the commission of prohibited acts.195 To prevent frivolous suits
brought by private parties in search of an award of double or other
damages, section 11 (h) ' of the new Act provides for the award of
reasonable attorneys fees to successful defendants.
Although private complainants are limited to awards in the
amount of actual injury in cases involving violations of the Shipping
Act other than those specified above for which double damages are
awarded, and frivolous suits are discouraged by the granting of at-
torneys fees, cases won by plaintiffs against foreign nationals would
still involve extraterritorial application of United States law. In addi-
189. Id. This is the same provision that would require referral to the President if a
penalty were assessed for noncompliance with discovery orders. See supra text accompanying
note 174. The Shipping Act of 1916 did not have a provision similar to 1984 Act § 13(b)(6),
46 U.S.C.A. § 1712(b)(6) (West Supp. 1984).
190. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1706(c)(2) (West Supp. 1984).
191. Id. at § 1711.
192. 1984 Act § 6(g), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1705(g) (West Supp. 1984). See supra text ac-
companying notes 132-40.
193. CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 120, at 40-41, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 296-97.
194. The prohibited acts are encompassed in the following sections: 1984 Act § 10(b)(5)
or (7), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1709(b)(5) or (7) (West Supp. 1984); 1984 Act § 10(c)(1) or (4), 46
U.S.C.A. § 1709(c)(1) or (4) (West Supp. 1984); and 1984 Act § 10(a)(2) or (3), 46
U.S.C.A. § 1709(a)(2) or (3) (West Supp. 1984).
195. The authors in Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 32, suggest that this increase in
remedies under the Shipping Act for private plaintiffs may be designed to counterbalance the
elimination of private remedies under the antitrust laws. Id. at 334 n.121.
196. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1710(h) (West Supp. 1984).
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tion, under section 11, the Commission may investigate perceived vi-
olations of the Act on its own motion. After notice and hearing it
may assess a penalty against the violator pursuant to section 13(a)
and (c). 197 This also, in the case of a foreign carrier, would be an
extraterritorial application of United States law.
Nothing in section 11 forces the Commission or the courts to
consider the effect such awards to private plaintiffs would have on
foreign policy. 198 Similarly, they are not required to refer the issue to
the President for approval or disapproval prior to assessment.199 And
section 13(c),200 regarding the assessment of civil penalties, only pro-
vides that in determining the amount of the penalty, "the Commis-
sion shall take into account the nature, circumstances, extent, and
gravity of the violation committed and, with respect to the violator,
the degree of culpability, history of prior offenses, ability to pay, and
such other matters as justice may require."20t Nothing regarding
foreign relations or the laws of another country need be considered.
2. Miscellaneous. (a) Tariffs.-The United States is the only
country that requires shipping tariffs to be filed. According to the
Judiciary Committee Report, it was for this reason that the Reagan
Administration recommended eliminating the tariff filing require-
ment in the new Shipping Act. 2 In the interest of maintaining a
certain amount of competitiveness between carriers and conferences,
however, the tariff filing requirement remained in the legislation. 0 3
Therefore, on this point too, United States shipping policy under the
1984 Act is not in harmony with international shipping practices.
(b) "Open" conferences.-"Open" conferences are still required
under the 1984 Act.204 This requirement is at complete odds with
general international shipping practices under which so-called
"closed" conferences are tolerated. 05 Under an "open" system, a
conference must admit and readmit any carrier willing to service a
particular trade. No penalties may be imposed for withdrawal from
the conference. 0 6
197. Id. at § 1712(a) & (c).
198. See Timberlane Lumber, supra note 99.
199. See supra notes 174 & 188.
200. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1712(c) (West Supp. 1984).
201. Id.
202. MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 18,
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 183.
203. 1984 Act § 8, 46 U.S.C.A. § 1707 (West Supp. 1984).
204. See 1984 Act § 5(b)(2), (3), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1704(b)(2), (3) (West Supp. 1984).
205. See supra note 31 (regarding open conferences).
206. MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 13-14,
30, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 178-79, 195.
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(c) Loyalty Contracts.-Under section 10(b)(9) of the new Act,
loyalty contracts are prohibited except when they conform to anti-
trust laws.20 7 Such contracts were sanctioned under section 14b of
the 1916 Act208 and are generally used internationally. 0 9 In the
event antitrust laws are applied to carriers using loyalty contracts,
conflicts could arise in United States relations with other countries.
V. The Shipping Act of 1984--One Example
The shift to a "substantially anticompetitive" general standard,
the adoption of discovery procedures flexible enough to consider con-
flict of laws problems, and the implementation of other provisions of
the 1984 Act that are responsive to international shipping practices
do a great deal to bring the United States in line with shipping poli-
cies of other nations. This is true notwithstanding the potential
problems that may arise if: (1) penalties are assessed against carriers
for blocking United States-flag vessels in foreign ports; (2) double
damage awards are given to private plaintiffs; or (3) foreign carriers
balk at the Commission's regulations concerning tariffs, open confer-
ences, or loyalty contracts.
The ramifications of a new act, however, are difficult to perceive
through a mere recitation of its major provisions. To better illustrate
how the 1984 Act will operate, the last portion of this Comment
applies the Act's key sections to a set of facts based on the situation
found in the North Atlantic Shipping cases.210
A. Fact Situation
In June of 1983 the Ocean Bridge Conference, a group of ocean
common carriers composed entirely of non-United States-flag vessels
hailing from three European nations, decided to enter the United
States-Europe trade. In compliance with United States shipping reg-
ulations and pursuant to the Shipping Act of 1916, then in effect,
the conference filed the Ocean Bridge Agreement with the Federal
Maritime Commission. The agreement was approved by the Com-
mission pursuant to section 15 of the 1916 Act in November of
1983, and the conference began operating in the United States-Euro-
pean trade in December of that same year.
In July of 1984 the All-Trades Shipping Company, feeling that
the Ocean Bridge Conference's rates were too high, decided to con-
207. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1709(b)(9) (West Supp. 1984). See supra note 11.
208. 46 U.S.C. § 813a (1982), repealed by 1984 Act § 20(a), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1719(a)
(West Supp. 1984).
209. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2 U.N. Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences (Final Act) at 7-8, U.N. Doe.
TD/CODE/I 3/Add.1 (1975).
210. See supra note 9 and text accompanying notes 106-09.
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tainerize their goods and truck them to a major port on the Gulf of
Mexico to be shipped to Europe via another conference known as the
Gulf Conference. In September, All-Trades had another shipment
that needed to be transported to Europe. This time, however, there
had been a drastic increase in interstate trucking rates. All-Trades
decided it would be more economical to return to the services of the
Ocean Bridge Conference. When they approached the Conference
carriers, however, their shipment was refused. No reason for the re-
fusal was given.
All-Trades suspected that the Ocean Bridge Conference had re-
taliated against them for using the services of the Gulf Conference
in July. They also suspected that Ocean Bridge's high rates were the
result of a secret agreement that was not covered by the provisions of
the agreement on file with the Federal Maritime Commission. All-
Trades further believed that the agreement was so anticompetitive
that it should never have been approved by the Commission. All-
Trades sought legal advice regarding what remedies were available.
B. Remedies Under the Shipping Act of 1984
All-Trades Shipping was disappointed to find that under section
7(c)(2) 211 of the new Act private plaintiffs were no longer afforded
the remedy of a private treble damage action. 12 All-Trades was told,
however, that the 1984 Act applied to complaints similar to theirs
regarding Ocean Bridge's conduct. This was true even though the
agreement under which the Conference was operating had been filed
and approved prior to March 10, 1984 (the date of the enactment of
the 1984 Act), since all agreements approved prior to that date con-
tinued in force as if approved under the new Act. In addition, All-
Trades' claim arose out of conduct occurring after March 20, 1984,
bringing it within the purview of the new Act.213
Regarding All-Trades' claim that the Ocean Bridge Conference
was too anticompetitive, the shipping company as a private com-
plainant could not force review of the Ocean Bridge agreement on
file with the Federal Maritime Commission. Review of an agreement
for substantially anticompetitive effects is left to the Federal Mari-
time Commission under sections 11 (a), 11 (c), 6(g), and 6(h) of the
new Act.2"
211. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1706(c)(2) (West Supp. 1984).
212. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1982).
213. See note on "Savings Provisions" following § 2 of the 1984 Act, 46 U.S.C.A. §
1701 (West Supp. 1984). Had the conduct occurred prior to March 20, 1984 (the effective
date of the 1984 Act, see supra note 1), the provisions of the 1916 Act would have applied to
any claim brought or penalty assessed.
214. 1984 Act § 1l(a), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1710(a) (West Supp. 1984), provides that no
person may file a complaint with the Commission alleging that a conference agreement is
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All-Trades, however, may file a complaint with the Commission
under section 11 (a) 215 alleging that the rates fixed by Ocean Bridge
were pursuant to an agreement not filed with the Commission in vio-
lation of section 5.2 16 In the same complaint All-Trades may also
allege that the Conference violated section 10(b)(5)2 17 by refusing
space accommodations in retaliation for All-Trades' use of the Gulf
Conference in July. The Commission may then conduct an investiga-
tion pursuant to its power under section 11 (c). 218 While the investi-
gation is ongoing, the Conference may continue operating unless an
injunction is granted by the district court under section 11(h)219 on
the motion of the Commission or All-Trades. 2
A problem may arise during the investigation if the Commission
requests documents22 1 from one of the foreign carriers and that car-
rier claims that its government has passed a blocking statute that
will not permit the carrier to comply with the document request. The
Commission must then bring the matter to the Secretary of State
who will consult the government of the nation in which the docu-
ments are alleged to be located for the purpose of obtaining the doc-
uments.222 If the Secretary of State is unsuccessful, and the Com-
mission does not cancel its document request, nothing in the new Act
or the regulations prevents it from assessing a penalty against the
carrier for non-production pursuant to section 13(b)(2).223 Before
such an assessment could become effective, however, it would have to
be submitted to the President who may disapprove it if he finds it
contrary to the national defense or foreign policy interests of the
substantially anticompetitive under the definition of § 6(g), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1705(g) (West
Supp. 1984). Section 11(c), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1710(c) (West Supp. 1984), provides that the
Commission may, when it finds an agreement is operating in violation of § 6(g), take action
pursuant to subsection (h) of § 6 (under which the Commission must seek an injunction in
federal district court). The burden in this instance would be on the Commission. See supra
text accompanying note 129.
215. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1712(a) (West Supp. 1984).
216. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1704 (West Supp. 1984).
217. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1709(b)(5) (West Supp. 1984).
218. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1710(c) (West Supp. 1984).
219. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1710(h)(1) (West Supp. 1984) (authorizing the Commission to
bring suit in district court to enjoin the defendant's conduct); § 1710(2) (permitting a private
plaintiff to file suit in district court to enjoin the defendant's conduct).
220. However, there is a danger associated with initiating a suit for an injunction. If the
defendant prevails, his reasonable attorneys fees will be assessed and collected as part of the
costs of the suit. See supra text accompanying note 196.
221. A request for production of documents would be made pursuant to 1984 Act § 12,
46 U.S.C.A. § 1711 (West Supp. 1984).
222. 1984 Act § 13(b)(4), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1712(b)(4) (West Supp. 1984).
223. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1712(b)(2) (West Supp. 1984). This section states:
For failure to supply information ordered to be produced or compelled by
subpena under section 1711 of this title, the Commission may, after notice and
* an opportunity for hearing, suspend any or all tariffs of a common carrier or that
common carrier's right to use any or all tariffs of conferences of which it is a
member.
Id. See supra text accompanying note 173.
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United States.224
Regarding the issue of whether rate-fixing by Ocean Bridge
falls within the bounds of the agreement filed with the Federal Mari-
time Commission, if the rate is found to be outside the agreement,
the Commission must decide whether the rate-fixing was undertaken
"with a reasonable basis to conclude that . . . it [was] pursuant to
an agreement on file with the Commission and in effect when the
activity took place ... "225 If Ocean Bridge had a reasonable basis
for believing that the "secret" rate agreement was encompassed in
the approved agreement, All-Trades will not be able to claim repara-
tions. If, however, the belief is not reasonable, the Commission must
direct payment of reparations to All-Trades for any actual injury
caused by this violation, including the loss of interest at commercial
rates compounded from the date of the injury plus reasonable attor-
neys fees.226
The allegation that Ocean Bridge retaliated against All-Trades
Shipping could bring a greater damage award than simply compen-
sation for actual injury. Retaliation against a shipper for using an-
other conference contrary to section 10(b)(5)227 is one of the viola-
tions for which the Commission, in its discretion, is permitted to
award additional amounts up to an amount equal to double the ac-
tual damages. 2 8 Again, however, the Commission must first find,
pursuant to section 7(a)(2),229 that the Conference had no reasona-
ble basis for believing that the activity fell within the bounds of the
agreement on file with the Commission. If by some chance Ocean
Bridge was found to have had a reasonable basis for believing its
retaliatory conduct fell within the bounds of the agreement, the
Commission could not award reparations to All-Trades.
All-Trades might be happy to know, however, that, if after no-
tice and an opportunity for a hearing, Ocean Bridge is found in vio-
lation of the Act, it will be liable to the United States for a civil
penalty in addition to the order for reparation that will be granted
All-Trades.2 30 The assessment of this civil penalty and an order for
224. Section 13(b)(6), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1712(b)(6) (West Supp. 1984). Therefore, even if
the case is very strong against Ocean Bridge, All-Trades should be aware that because of the
new Act's flexibility toward political considerations (illustrated by the Presidential veto provi-
sion), the outcome may not be what it expects from the weight of the evidence.
225. Section 7(a)(2), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1706(a)(2) (West Supp. 1984). See supra text ac-
companying notes 149-51. This is the sole inquiry the FMC must make under this subsection
since the conference has not been granted an exemption by the Commission under § 16 of the
1984 Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 1715 (West Supp. 1984). Otherwise, the FMC would have had to
analyze the conduct to determine whether it fell within the exemption.
226. 1984 Act § 11(g), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1710(g) (West Supp. 1984).
227. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1709(b)(5) (West Supp. 1984) (prohibiting retaliation against a
shipper by refusing space accomodations when available).
228. 1984 Act § 11(g), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1710(g) (West Supp. 1984).
229. 46 U.S.C.A. § 1706(a)(2) (West Supp. 1984).
230. 1984 Act § 13(a), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1712(a) (West Supp. 1984).
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reparations are not among the penalties reviewed by the President
before becoming effective. Ocean Bridge may appeal the assessment
of the civil penalty.
2 31
VI. Conclusion
The Shipping Act of 1984 substantially alters United States
policy toward international shipping. The United States is now much
more in harmony with international shipping practices than it was
under the 1916 Act. Limitation of extraterritorial application of
United States antitrust laws to foreign carriers, through abolition of
private treble damage actions and otherwise, is a significant conces-
sion to the complaints of foreign governments.
The new Shipping Act, however, is still not in complete har-
mony with international shipping practices. The United States and
the Federal Maritime Commission must be careful, particularly in
assessing penalties against foreign nationals for conduct that occurs
outside the United States that is not illegal in their own countries.
An extremely stringent application of United States shipping laws
abroad could cause foreign governments to retaliate in forms more
drastic than the simple blocking laws of the past.232 Ultimately, all
the cooperation the United States Government seeks, and indeed
needs, to regulate United States shipping industry under the 1984
Act could be jeopardized.
Martha L. Cecil
231. 1984 Act § 13(d), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1712(d) (West Supp. 1984) (an assessment of a
civil penalty may be reviewed under chapter 158 of Title 28).
232. Retaliation was considered by various European countries and Japan prior to the
passage of the 1984 Act. Methods under consideration included, among other things, raising
harbor dues on United States ships. McIntosh, Anti-trust implications of liner conferences:
Alternatives to the regulation of liner trades with emphasis on the European approach,
LLOYDS M. C. L. Q. 139, 152 (1980). Since the FMC is obligated under 1984 Act § 13(b)(5),
46 U.S.C.A. § 1712(b)(5) (West Supp. 1984), to penalize foreign carriers or the carriers of
nations which impair the access of United States-flag ships to foreign ports, raising harbor
dues for United States-flag ships or like forms of retaliation could touch off a viscious circle of
reprisals between the United States and the foreign government(s) concerned. See also 49
Fed. Reg. 45,406 (1984) (to be codified at 46 C.F.R. Pt. 587).
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